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ACCESS FOR THE FUTURE: IMPROVING MAINE’S 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST 
DOCTRINE THROUGH MUNICIPAL CONTROLS TO 
ENSURE COASTAL ACCESS FOR CONTINUING 






The public trust doctrine generally guarantees the public access to 
the shoreline, which is held in trust for the public by the state. In 
Maine, a pre-Revolutionary War ordinance limits the public trust 
doctrine by granting private landowners rights to the same shoreline 
areas. Access to the shoreline area is subject to frequent legal battles 
and court decisions have not cured the conflict between the public's 
rights and the private landowners' rights. Maine's economy relies 
heavily on public access to the shoreline. This comment suggests 
that the public's rights should be protected. First, the public trust 
doctrine does not violate any part of the Maine State Constitution. 
Second, the ordinance that grants private landowners rights does not 
erase the public's rights. Third, public access to the shoreline can be 
established through land use controls. Land use controls will enable 












                                            
1 J.D. Candidate, University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2020. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this country, private real property ownership occupies a 
sacred place in the legal canon.  Beyond the principle of eminent 
domain, which is heavily restricted through various takings 
doctrines,2 few mechanisms can interfere with a private property 
owner’s rights to the exclusive use and enjoyment of their land.3  
History, however, established an exception to these sacred property 
rights that is the subject of frequent legal and legislative debate: the 
public trust doctrine.  At its most basic meaning, the public trust 
doctrine is a legal principle enshrining the public’s right to use of 
navigable waters, delegating protection of this right to the individual 
states.4  The application of this doctrine, however, is anything but 
basic.  There are as many definitions and implementation methods 
of this doctrine as there are jurisdictions subject to it.5  Each state 
must determine what the public trust doctrine will look like within 
its jurisdiction, based generally around defining the following: 
 
(1) [T]he waters subject to state/public ownership; 
(2) the line or lines dividing private from public title 
in those waters; (3) the waters subject to public use 
rights; (4) the line or lines in those waters that mark 
the limit of public use rights; and (5) the public uses 
that the doctrine will protect in the waters where the 
public has use rights.6 
 
With these elements defined, states must take on the task of 
defending them in the interest of the public.  However, states are 
                                            
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Takings Clause of this Amendment states “nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Id. 
(This Clause forms the backbone of takings doctrines barring commandeering of 
private property for use by the public and applies to the states as well as the 
federal government). 
3 Peter H. Kenlan, Maine’s Open Lands: Public Use of Private Land, The Right 
to Roam, and The Right to Exclude, 68ME. L. REV.. 185, 187-88 (2016). 
4 Public-trust doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
5 See Robin K. Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust 
Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 
PENN. ST. ENVT’L. L. REV.. 1 (2007). 
6 Id. at 3. 
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often hindered in attempts to implement straightforward 
applications of the doctrine, despite the long historical traditions 
supporting it.  The public’s rights to shoreland areas in particular 
face consistent obstacles.  Relying on the Takings Clause and 
societal interests in preserving private property rights, private 
landowners regularly bring challenges in courtrooms, municipal 
settings, and before state governments when they fall subject to the 
doctrine as their state defines it.7  These legal challenges illustrate 
the inherent tension between the culturally iconic value of private 
property ownership and the history- and policy-driven public trust 
doctrine.  This history of litigation and occasional uproar has 
dramatically influenced the way the public trust doctrine is defined 
and enforced around the country.8  Myriad articles and comments 
have been written suggesting solutions to these conflicts, but no 
clear answer has arisen as of yet. 
 
 Without any clear answer on the nature of the public trust 
doctrine in Maine, the public’s rights remain vague.  Because of 
certain court decisions, the public currently have limited access to 
Maine’s coastal shoreland areas, where private persons own the 
upland lots, based entirely on the willingness of the landowners to 
allow the public access to the shoreline and public access to the 
shoreline is decided entirely by those private, upland owners.9  Many 
argue that this violates the rights protected by the public trust 
                                            
7 See Colin H. Roberts, It’s All Mine, Stay Off, and Let Me Do What I Please: 
An Abyss Between the Rights and Desires of Coastal Property Owners and 
Public Privileges and Protections?, 18 J OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 255 (2013); 
Haochen Sun, Toward a New Social-Political Theory of the Public Trust 
Doctrine, VT. L. REV. 563 (2011). 
8 “The nature and extent of the public’s interest in the intertidal zone has been a 
subject of much debate, litigation, and judicial writing.” Ross v. Acadian 
Seaplants, Ltd., 2019 ME 45, ¶ 13, 206 A.3d 283.  
9 See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989); ORLANDO DELOGU, 
MAINE’S BEACHES ARE PUBLIC PROPERTY: THE BELL CASES MUST BE 
REEXAMINED (2017) (presenting the controversial opinion that a series of cases 
in the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in the 1980s, culminating in Bell v Town of 
Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989), were incorrectly decided and must be 
overturned.  These cases will be discussed in this comment); MARINE LAW 
INST., UNIV. OF ME. SCH. OF LAW, PUBLIC SHORELINE ACCESS AND THE MOODY 
BEACH CASE (1990).  
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doctrine.10  In order to suggest a solution to this conflict between the 
rights of the public and the private landowners, this comment will 
explore the public trust doctrine in coastal Maine through its history, 
controversies, and current applications.  It will not cover the public 
trust doctrine as it applies to inland waterways, although tensions 
exist in those contexts, as well.   
 
To best address the concerns around the public trust doctrine 
in Maine, the State should pass legislation authorizing towns to 
enact or enforce land use and land control programs that give private 
landowners certain ownership rights to intertidal11 lands while still 
allowing the State to hold those lands in trust for the people of 
Maine.   By doing this, the State of Maine can honor the rights and 
interests of the private landowners while allowing the public to 
exercise their rights to use the land covered under the doctrine.  First, 
this comment will summarize the history and background of the 
public trust doctrine in Maine and how a unique pre-Revolutionary 
War colonial ordinance has affected it.  Next, it will discuss the ways 
in which Maine’s current implementation of the public trust doctrine 
does not properly adhere to the doctrine’s meanings and goals. It 
will then analyze three aspects related to Maine’s application of the 
doctrine: 1) whether it aligns with the Maine State Constitution; 2) 
how to reconcile the doctrine with the Massachusetts Colonial 
Ordinance of 1641-1647; and 3) whether the use of local land use 
controls can improve public access to the shoreline under the 
doctrine.  Finally, this comment will briefly map out a strategy for 
the State to use in amending the implementation of the public trust 
doctrine to better protect the public’s rights while honoring the 
rights of littoral landowners.12 
                                            
10 See DELOGU, supra note 8. See also Ross, 2019 ME 45, 206__ A.3d 283__ 
(Saufley, C.J., concurring); McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, 28 A.3d 62 
(Levy, J, concurring). 
11 “[D]escribed as the area from the mean high-water mark to the mean low-
water mark but not more than 100 rods” Ross, 2019 ME 45, ¶ 10, 206__ A.3d 
283__ (majority opinion). 
12 Littoral: “Of, relating to, or involving the coast or shore of an ocean, sea, or 
lake.” Littoral, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In this comment, the 
phrase littoral landowners refers to the private property owners of the land 
directly adjacent to the coastal waters.  Littoral owners are often referred to as 
“upland owners” in documents discussing the public trust doctrine. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND FRAMEWORK OF THE 
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN MAINE 
When discussing the public trust doctrine in Maine, the pre- 
and post-Revolutionary War history of the state provides an 
important legal foundation for the development and application of 
this doctrine.13  The area currently comprising the State of Maine 
was originally under the jurisdiction of the Colony of 
Massachusetts, making it subject to the laws of Massachusetts until 
Maine obtained statehood in 1820.14  Before Maine became a 
separate state, Massachusetts enacted an ordinance, the 
Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance of 1641-1647, that granted 
private shoreland landowners title in fee simple absolute15—that is, 
full ownership rights, including the right to exclude others from the 
shoreland down to the low water mark.16  The Ordinance required 
landowners to avoid interfering with the public’s navigation, 
fishing, and fowling, although the public was not allowed to 
interfere with the owner’s right to build wharves on this land.17  
 
 At the time, this grant of title ran counter to the English 
common law that formed the background of much of the legal 
                                            
13 Ross, 2019 ME 45, ¶ 9, 206 A.3d 283. 
14 Craig, supra note 4, at 61. 
15 “An interest in land that, being the broadest property interest allowed by law, 
endures until the current holder dies without heirs” Fee simple, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). “An estate of indefinite or potentially infinite 
duration . . . Often shortened to fee simple or fee.” Fee simple absolute, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
16 Craig, supra note 4, at 66 (referencing the goal of encouraging private 
landowners to build wharves on the intertidal land in an effort to grow 
commerce outside of the Crown’s control). See also Conservation Law Found. 
v. Dept. of Envt’l Protection, 2003 ME 62, ¶ 36, 823 A.2d 551, 563 (confirming 
that private landowners have the right to “wharf out,”, subject to “reasonable 
regulation,”, and that the public is not allowed to interfere with this right, despite 
the right to fishing, fowling, and navigation).  The low water mark or mean low 
water mark is “the annual average of the height on the shore reached by the 
water at its lowest ebb each day.” Low Water Mark (Mean Low Water Mark or 
MLW), THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY DESK EDITION 
(2012). 
17 Craig, supra note 4, at 66. 
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framework of the colonies and the United States.18  English common 
law had delineated the ownership of this land to the crown, “subject 
to the public’s rights of ‘navigation,’ ‘commerce,’ and ‘fishing,’” 
while the Ordinance granted that ownership to private persons.19  
Because Maine was under the jurisdiction of the Colony of 
Massachusetts at the time this unique Colonial Ordinance was 
enacted and therefore subject to it, the development of the public 
trust doctrine and concepts of public access and use rights to 
shoreland areas has not paralleled that of the rest of the United States 
and even the rest of the world.20  Unfortunately, the result is “one of 
the most restrictive public trust doctrines in the country.”21 
 
Although Maine’s public trust doctrine is restrictive, the 
Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, has upheld 
at least in words the basic principles of the public trust doctrine 
based on the Maine Constitution.22  When asked to review the 
constitutionality of a bill permitting the State to release the State’s 
ownership interests in areas of intertidal land filled by private 
landowners, the court determined that this fell within the State’s role 
as trustees of the public interest under Maine Constitution Article 
IV, pt. 3, § 1 (the “Legislative Powers Clause”).23  However, the 
Maine courts have stopped short of clearly identifying the 
constitutional foundation for the public trust doctrine.24  Fortunately, 
the courts have repeatedly expressed adherence to the goals and 
policies of the public trust doctrine.25  The Law Court also has taken 
occasion in its opinions to recognize the importance of the public 
trust doctrine, including the rights to fishing, fowling, and 
navigation, while acknowledging changing circumstances that 
                                            
18 Id. 
19 Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., 2019 ME 45, ¶ 10, 206 A.3d 283. 
20 Kenlan, supra note 2, at 203. 
21 Id. 
22 Op. of Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 606 (Me. 1981).   
23 Id. 
24 Harding v. Comm’r of Marine Res., 510 A.2d 533, 537 (1986) (refusing to 
identify any specific basis for the public trust doctrine in Maine’s State 
Constitution). 
25 See, e.g., Op. of Justices, 437 A.2d at 606. 
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might influence its interpretation and application.26  The Court has 
specifically suggested that public interests in submerged lands might 
be expanded as society grows.27  Thus, the courts have indicated that 
the Maine State Constitution contains some consideration for the 
public trust doctrine and that the rights it protects are adaptable, 
despite the restrictiveness imposed on it by the Massachusetts 
Colonial Ordinance of 1641-1647. 
 
While the constitutional connection has not yet been made 
explicit, Maine has several statutes that elaborate on the potential 
constitutional consideration.  Although a legislative act specifically 
codifying the public’s rights to fishing, fowling, navigation, and 
recreation in the intertidal zone was declared an unconstitutional 
taking by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court,28 several other statutes 
clearly designate that certain intertidal and submerged lands are held 
by the State in trust for the public.29  The specific language of these 
statutes varies, but each supports the conclusion that the State of 
                                            
26 Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., 2019 ME 45, ¶ 36 n.12, 206 A.3d 283 
(listing activities deemed permissible by the courts under an expansive view of 
fishing, fowling, and navigation); McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, 28 
A.3d 620, ¶ 37, 39 (majority opinion) (suggesting that fishing, fowling, and 
navigation should be “broad[ly] underst[ood and] adapted to reflect the realities 
of use in each era”); Op. of Justices, 437 A.2d at 607.  
27 Harding, 510 A.2d at 537. 
28 Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 173-76 (Me. 1989). 
29 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1846 (2018) (codifying the State’s holding 
of public reserved lands in trust for the public); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 
1862(3) (2018) (allowing the State to lease and grant easements over intertidal 
and submerged lands unless the lease or easement “will unreasonably interfere 
with customary or traditional public access ways to or public trust rights in, on, 
or over the intertidal or submerged lands and the waters above those lands”); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1865 (2018) (reaffirming that the State holds 
submerged lands in the public trust while neglecting to make a definitive 
statement regarding intertidal lands, although different approaches to statutory 
interpretation could find this either indicative of or contradictory to the State’s 
interest in the intertidal land for the benefit of the public); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 36, § 6855 (2018) (“The Legislature, recognizing that the submerged and 
intertidal lands . . . are owned by the State for the benefit of the public and are 
impressed with a public trust . . . .”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 435 (2018) 
(declaring zoning and land use controls of shoreland areas to be in the public 
interest and to fall under the State’s role as trustee of this land for the public). 
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Maine holds some authority over the use and disposition of intertidal 
lands in its role as trustee for the people. 
 
III. MAINE’S CURRENT APPLICATION OF THE  
     PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE DOES NOT PROPERLY 
 ADHERE TO THE DOCTRINE’S MEANING AND 
GOALS 
 
While it would be inaccurate to call the public trust doctrine 
a universal principle with the same meaning and goals in every 
jurisdiction,30 the general current of thought in Maine’s legal 
community clarifies a few of the basic ideals embodied in the 
doctrine in this state. 
A.  The Public Trust Doctrine is Meant to Ensure Access to 
 the Intertidal Zones by the General Public and Not Just 
 Private Littoral Owners 
 
Although the history of the public trust doctrine in Maine is 
inextricably wrapped up in the Colonial Ordinance from 
Massachusetts and competing common and statutory law 
provisions, court decisions and commentators return time and again 
to the policy goals embodied in the public trust doctrine.  These legal 
sources affirm that private littoral landowners have title in fee 
simple absolute to the low water mark in tidal areas, but they 
routinely assert that this title does not exempt these landowners from 
providing the public access to the shoreland.31  Although the Maine 
Supreme Judicial Court has declined to make a precedential ruling 
on the nature of these competing interests in the same property,32 a 
                                            
30 See Craig, supra note 4. 
31 “[T]he public trust doctrine means, for the owner of coastal property, that the 
owner's property rights in the intertidal zone are subject to the public's rights to 
fishing, fowling, and navigation. However, the public's rights in these activities 
have always been subject to the owner's ’right to wharf out to the navigable 
portion of the body of water.’" Conservation Law Found. v. Dept. of Envtl. 
Prot., 2003 ME 62, ¶ 36, 823 A.2d 551, 563 (quoting Great Cove Boat Club v. 
Bureau of Pub. Lands, 672 A.2d 91, 95 (Me. 1996)). 
32 “Our jurisprudence has not clearly established, for all purposes, the 
delineation between the public and private rights in and to the intertidal area.” 
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solution to these issues need not come from a landmark court 
decision, an amendment to the State Constitution, nor sweeping 
legislative action.  Examining the interactions between the 
principles at the foundation of the legal tangle that exists today 
shows that a solution requires no drastic action. 
When looked at from a critical historical perspective, the 
Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47 does not establish an 
impenetrable right to exclude for all littoral landowners.33  Instead, 
the Ordinance specifies that the reason the landowners were granted 
title to the land down to the low water mark was to encourage 
“wharfing out” in an attempt to circumvent the trade monopoly held 
by the British on goods shipped by sea.34  Unfortunately, in trying to 
take power from the British Crown in favor of the Massachusetts 
residents, the Ordinance disrupted the ancient principles of the 
public trust doctrine.35   
                                            
Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., 2019 ME 45, ¶ 13, 206 A.3d 283; see also 
McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, 28 A.3d 620; Almeder v. Town of 
Kennebunkport, 2019 ME 151, 217 A.3d 1111 (determining that the Town holds 
title to the disputed beach by tracing ownership to colonial era land grants, 
wherefore the private property owners have no right to exclude the public). 
33 The right to exclude is one of the basic rights of property ownership and is 
particularly fiercely guarded in Maine. Kenlan, supra note 2, at 187. 
34 The Colony of Massachusetts enacted the Ordinance with myriad purposes 
behind it, but the grant of title to the shoreland property owners was motivated 
first by a desire to ensure that the residents of coastal communities could access 
the water for food and resources and secondly for the purpose of privatizing 
trade.  Under British Colonial rule, all the wharves and shipping stations were 
controlled by the Crown, keeping the Colonies entirely dependent on British 
magnanimity to maintain reliable trade with the rest of the world.  When the 
Ordinance took effect, the private property owners were encouraged to “wharf 
out” on their land, that is, build wharves that trading vessels could dock at and 
avoid the Crown’s controls.  The property owners were able to build wharves 
only after they were granted title to the intertidal zone because the Crown had 
previously controlled all building in the area between the high-water mark and 
the low-water mark.  Sidney St. F. Thaxter, Will Bell v. Town of Wells be 
Eroded with Time? 57ME. L. REV.. 117, 123-25 (2005). 
35 “By the law of nature these things are common to all mankind--the air, 
running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea. No one, 
therefore, is forbidden to approach the seashore, provided that he respects 
habitations, monuments, and the buildings, which are not, like the sea, subject 
only to the law of nations.” JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTIONS II.1.1 (Thomas Collett 
Sandars trans., 7th Am. ed. 1876). 
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Despite this, the Ordinance made clear that the grant of title 
was for trade purposes and was not meant to interfere with public 
rights, as long as the public uses did not interfere with trade.36  Thus, 
an historically faithful adherence to the Massachusetts Colonial 
Ordinance does not require blind deference to the whims of the 
private landowners.  If the Ordinance is viewed as, it was intended—
preventing state-control of all trade by opening up shipping to 
private persons—then there need not be any conflict with the public 
trust doctrine.  A landowner can successfully build wharves and 
receive trade on their coastal property while the public enjoys access 
to the land for fishing, fowling, navigation, and even recreation.  
Rather than follow the line of certain controversial Law Court cases 
and leave the public entirely at the mercy of landowners for gaining 
access to the intertidal zone for any purpose,37 Maine can find a via 
media honoring the intent of both the Ordinance of 1647 and the 
much older public trust doctrine. 
 
B.  Ensuring Public Shoreline Access is Essential to the 
 Character and Future of Maine 
 
The coastline in Maine is vast but little of it is open for public 
access.38  The general public traditionally should have the right to 
engage in fishing, fowling, and navigation in the intertidal zone.39 
These three activities intimately relate to the centrality of the 
coastline in Maine’s culture.  Much of Maine’s economy depends 
on access to the coastline, particularly in traditional occupations 
such as fishing.40  While the recent debate about the continuing 
                                            
35 Thaxter, supra note 33, at 123-24. 
37 Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 192 (Me. 1989) (Wathen, J., 
dissenting). 
38 Elizabeth Sheehan & Hugh Cowperthwaite, Preserving Commercial Fishing 
Access: A Study of Working Waterfronts in 25 Maine Communities 4 (Coastal 
Enterprises, Inc., 2002), 
https://www1.maine.gov/dmr/mcp/downloads/workingwaterfront/preservingcom
mercialfishing.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJ47-KMZR]. 
39 Kenlan, supra note 2, at 197. 
40 “Our commercial fishing industry makes a valuable and important 
contribution – as a producer of high quality protein to feed our families, as a 
generator of over 26,000 jobs, and as a creator of real income for Maine’s rural 
communities. In 2001, the industry’s economic impact climbed to over $860 
[2020] Access for the Future 313 
 
relevance of the limits placed on access by certain court decisions 
has honed in on recreation, the coast continues to provide a 
livelihood for many Maine residents.41  Even though expansion of 
public shoreline access should include recreational purposes, the 
current implementation of the public trust doctrine falls short of 
guaranteeing access for the three basic uses and this threatens 
Maine’s residents who depend on the shore for their income.  
Among fishing, fowling, and navigation, fishing by far occupies the 
most significant position in the interests of Maine’s residents and 
economic interests. 
 
1.  Fishing 
 
 Defined under Maine statute as “to take or attempt to take 
any marine organism by any method or means,”42 fishing comprises 
a major segment of Maine’s economy.43  With only 25% of 
commercial fishing access provided by public facilities, access to 
the other 75% via private avenues necessarily falls under the public 
trust doctrine.44  However, trends in coastal property ownership put 
this private access at risk.45  More and more, private landowners are 
restricting access to the shoreline for commercial fishing.46  Even 
traditionally, public access points are being converted to private use 
as land prices and interest in private ownership increases.47  Because 
commercial fishing contributes so significantly to the Maine 
                                            
million from $773 million the year before.” Sheehan &Cowperthwaite, supra 
note 37, at 4. 
41 Eaton v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 53, 760 A.2d 232, 249 (Saufley, J., 
concurring); see John Duff, Public Shoreline Access in Maine: A Citizen’s 
Guide to Ocean and Coastal Law 6-7 (Maine Sea Grant College Program, 
2016), https://www.maine.gov/dacf/parks/docs/public-shoreline-access-in-
maine.pdf, [https://perma.cc/8SGR-JUMU]. 
42 “Fish, the verb.  The verb ‘fish’ means to take or attempt to take any marine 
organism by any method or means.”  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6001(17) 
(2018). 
43 See Sheehan &Cowperthwaite, supra note 37. 
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economy, steps must be taken to ensure continued public access to 
the shoreline to prevent further damage to this industry.48 
 
 A further concern about fishing increases the need for 
expediency in clarifying and guaranteeing public access rights.  
Recent developments in demand for sea products beyond fish have 
sparked debate about what exactly qualifies as fishing for the 
purposes of the public trust doctrine.  Seaweed harvesting forms the 
center of these debates.  The Maine statute defining fishing refers 
only to “tak[ing] or attempt[ing] to take any marine organism by 
any method or means,”49 but the Law Court recently determined that 
harvesting rockweed, a type of seaweed that anchors in the top 
millimeters of the sea floor in the intertidal zone, does not fall under 
this definition.50  Although the concurrence allowed that taking 
seaweed “was not within the reasonable access contemplated” under 
the public trust doctrine, it also noted that Rhode Island amended its 
state constitution to include seaweed harvesting in the public’s 
rights.51  While the status of seaweed harvesting has been settled by 
the courts, any future confusion can be avoided by establishing clear 
rights and boundaries under the public trust doctrine in Maine and 
creating avenues for the public and landowners to settle access 
debates without resorting to lengthy and costly legal action. 
 
2.  Fowling and Navigation 
 
 The other two traditionally protected activities under the 
public trust doctrine, fowling and navigation, have not been the 
subject of nearly as much legal debate. Fowling is the narrower of 
the two in scope, covering only bird hunting.52  Navigation has seen 
occasional legal contests, but is generally understood in the 
traditional sense to mean boating on the water covering the intertidal 
lands, mooring on the submerged land, and pulling craft up on the 
                                            
48 Id. (identifying six main threats to the commercial fishing industry in Maine 
communities related to continued reduction of public access to the shoreline). 
49 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6001(17) (2018) (emphasis added). 
50 Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., 2019 ME 45, 206A.3d 283 Duff, supra note 
40, at 6-7. 
51 Ross, 2019 ME 45, ¶ 43 & n.14, 206 A.3d 283(Saufley, C.J., concurring). 
52 Duff, supra note 40, at 7. 
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intertidal land when the tide is out.53  These activities can be personal 
or commercial and can include taking on and discharging passengers 
and cargo.54  
 
 Interestingly, the Law Court held in 2011 that crossing the 
intertidal zone for commercial scuba diving fell under the 
“navigation” umbrella, although the concurrence urged that this 
activity strays into recreation and that the public trust doctrine needs 
to essentially be modernized to include recreation as a fourth 
permitted activity.55  The concurrence in Ross v. Acadian Seaplants 
went a step further and decried “the tortuous shoehorning of various 
activities into the constrictive trilogy by declaring the simple walk 
of a scuba diver across the intertidal zone to the ocean as fitting into 
the definition of ‘navigation.’”56  As long as the courts and 
legislature are constrained by the three traditional activities of 
fishing, fowling, and navigation, permissible activities that do not 
fit easily into any of the three will be “creatively” defined.57  This 
muddying of definitions will continue to take place until the rights 
of the public are clearly delineated.  Contorted linguistic reasoning 
will not make the public nor the private landowners any more 
confident in their rights.  Without a statewide system for managing 
public shoreline access, confusion will continue to grow. 
 
C.  The Confusing Precedent: The Moody Beach Cases 
 
 Much of the current confusion and debate about public rights 
stems from the restriction of those rights in the Moody Beach cases.  
A series of state court decisions from the 1980s, the Moody Beach 
cases are the most definitive and controversial public trust doctrine 
cases in the State of Maine.58  Concluded in 1989 with the Supreme 
                                            
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, 28 A.3d 620. 
56 Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., 2019 ME 45, ¶ 39, 206_ A.3d 283__ 
(Saufley, C.J., concurring). 
57 Id. 
58 Thaxter, supra note 33, at 117. Although the Law Court has faced questions of 
public shoreline access in the ensuing years, the Court has decided those cases 
without relying on the public trust doctrine. See Almeder, 2019 ME 151, 217 
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Judicial Court decision in Bell v .Town of  Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 
1989), the Moody Beach cases have been the subject of near-
constant discussion and, from some sectors, vociferous criticism.59  
The private landowners of twenty-eight shoreland lots in the Town 
of Wells, Maine brought an action against the town to enjoin the 
public’s recreational use of Moody Beach.60  Although the historic 
record shows that the public had been using Moody Beach 
recreationally since the nineteenth century, the landowners claimed 
title in fee simple absolute over the upland and intertidal areas, 
particularly expressing concern over the increase in public presence 
on the Beach and the accompanying increase in disruptions to the 
private landowners.61  The role of the court, then, was to decide if 
this title was valid and then to determine whether, notwithstanding 
the private landowner’s title, the public had a right to use the 
intertidal land on Moody Beach recreationally under the public trust 
doctrine.62  This case specifically focused on whether the public have 
a right to use the intertidal zone recreationally, not just for fishing, 
fowling, and navigation.63   
                                            
A.3d 1111 (decided using title); Ross, 2019 ME 45, ¶ 34, 206 A.3d 283 (decided 
based on the definition of fishing). 
59 See generally DELOGU, supra note 8 (presenting the controversial opinion that 
the Moody Beach cases should be overturned by the Maine Law Court or, if not, 
by the United States Supreme Court as unconstitutional); Thaxter, supra note 
33; Michael P. Dixon, Drawing Lines in the Disappearing Sand: A Reevaluation 
of Shoreline Rights and Regimes a Quarter Century After Bell v. Town of Wells, 
16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J.481 (2011); Kenlan, supra note 2. 
60 Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 170 (Me. 1989) (majority opinion). 
61 Bell, 557 A.2d at 170. Intertidal zone: “[L]and bounded by tide water 
extend[ing] from high water mark over the shore or flats to low water mark, if 
not beyond one hundred rods.” Shivley v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 18 (1894) 
(defining the intertidal zone based on the Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance of 
1641, from which Maine also derived its understanding of the intertidal zone). 
This has also been referred to as “‘flats,’ ‘foreshore,’ and ‘beachfront’” (see 
Bell, 557 A.2d at 169 n.3), but generally means the area of the shoreline 
between the mean high-water mark and the mean low water mark. See also 
McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 16, 28 A.3d 620, 625 (defining 
intertidal zone as the land between the average low tide line and the average 
high tide line).  
62 See Bell, 557 A.2d. at 169. 
63 Id. at 187 (Wathen, J., dissenting) (“Significantly, however, we have not held, 
nor even suggested, that the scheme of ownership established by the Ordinance 
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In its controversial ruling, the court determined that the 
private landowners held title in fee simple absolute under the 
Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance and that the public trust doctrine 
did not grant the general public the right to use Moody Beach 
recreationally.64 Part of that holding included rejecting the 
contention that the public had the right to use the intertidal zone 
through an easement established by custom of use, illustrating just 
how seriously the rights of private landowners are taken in Maine 
common law.65  The final disposition of the legal issues in these 
cases is generally seen as having expanded the rights of littoral 
landowners while narrowing the rights of the public under the public 
trust doctrine.66 
 
 In the final Moody Beach decision, the Law Court made two 
statements regarding the role of the legislature in addressing the 
tensions over intertidal lands.  The court first declared the Public 
Trust in Intertidal Land Act of 198767 unconstitutional but then 
suggested in the conclusion of the majority opinion that a 
legislative solution would be the only way to successfully solve 
the ongoing confusion about the public’s rights to use the 
intertidal zone.68  This legislative solution has not yet been 
effectively pursued.  Following this suggestion from the Law 
Court, however, the Legislature can enact laws and rules that 
will better address public access concerns in Maine.  
 
 1.   The Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act Declared 
 Unconstitutional 
 
The Legislature tried to enact a law protecting public access 
rights with the Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act of 1987.  When 
                                            
precludes the public from using the intertidal zone for common recreational 
beach activities.”). 
64 Id. at 179-80 (majority opinion). 
65 Id. at 179. 
66 Orlando E. Delogu, Friend of the Court: An Array of Arguments to Urge 
Reconsideration of the Moody Beach Cases and Expand Public Use Rights in 
Maine’s Intertidal Zone, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 47, 47 (2011). 
67 The Public Trust in Intertidal Land. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §§ 571-73 
(2017) (declared unconstitutional by Bell, 557 A.2d). 
68 Bell, 557 A.2d at 180. 
318 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:2 
 
the court declared the Act unconstitutional, it added a further twist 
in the tangled relationship between judicial and legislative attempts 
to clarify the form and function of the public trust doctrine in 
Maine.69  The Maine State Legislature quickly drafted and passed 
the Intertidal Land Act while the Moody Beach cases were being 
litigated, after the first decision and before the final Law Court 
opinion.70  This legislative action is commonly seen as an attempt by 
the legislature to block the judiciary from interfering with the 
public’s rights under the public trust doctrine.71  The Intertidal Land 
Act announced that protecting public use of intertidal lands was “of 
great public interest and great concern to the State”72 and not only 
codified the common law rights under the public trust doctrine 
(fishing, fowling, and navigation) but included a right of the public 
to use the intertidal zone for recreational purposes.73  Before the 
Moody Beach case was appealed to the Law Court, the Superior 
Court had declared this Act unconstitutional under the separation of 
powers provisions of the Maine State Constitution.74   
 
However, the Supreme Judicial Court declined to make a 
separation of powers determination and instead attacked the 
Intertidal Land Act as an unconstitutional taking, announcing that 
the State, through the Act, essentially created an easement over the 
intertidal land for the general public.75  Taking land without 
compensation is barred by both the Maine and United States 
Constitutions.76  The broad language in the Act authorizing the 
general public to use intertidal land for “recreation” heavily 
burdened the fee holders, according to the court.77  Without 
                                            
69 Thaxter, supra note 33, at 132. 
70 Id. at 131-32. The two main Moody Beach cases are commonly referred to as 
Bell I (Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509 (Me. 1986)) and Bell II (Bell v. 
Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989)). 
71 Id. at 132. 
72 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 571 (2017). 
73 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 571 (2017) 
74 Bell v. Town of Wells, No. CV-84-125, 1987 Me. Super. LEXIS 256, at *45 
(Sept. 14, 1987) (referring to separation of powers as delineated in Maine 
Constitution article III.). 
75 Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 176-77 (Me. 1989). 
76 U.S. CONST. amend. V; ME. CONST. art. 1, § 21. 
77 Bell, 557 A.2d at 177. 
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compensating the landowners for that burden, the State had engaged 
in an unconstitutional taking by enacting the Intertidal Land Act.78  
The Legislature had attempted to preempt what it saw happening in 
the courts in the Moody Beach cases—the slow erosion of the 
sanctified public trust doctrine. However, the Act failed to serve as 
a barrier, and the court easily dispensed with the Act and the goals 
of the Legislature in the final Moody Beach decision.79 
 
2.  Suggested Legislative Solution 
 
 In striking down the Intertidal Land Act, the court did not 
preclude all legislative action.  Ultimately, the decisions in the 
Moody Beach cases illustrated the tension between the sanctity of 
private land ownership and the long tradition of the public trust 
doctrine.  With the facts of the cases as they stood, the Law Court 
concluded that the arguments for the general public’s recreational 
use of Moody Beach were unconvincing and that the Legislature had 
failed to craft a constitutional law to that effect.80  However, the 
discussion does not end there.  While the Law Court found the 
Intertidal Land Act unconstitutional and concurrently granted 
private littoral landowners greater advantages over the public trust 
doctrine their final Moody Beach decision did not close the door on 
the issue.81  The Legislature, clearly, had failed to draft sufficiently 
well crafted legislation to block the courts from further limiting the 
general public’s shoreland access and use rights.  The court, 
however, left space for the Legislature to try again.82  The court 
suggested that a solution perhaps should not come not from broad 
legislative acts but instead from state and municipal land controls.83  
Because the public trust doctrine has been developed through 
                                            
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 180. 
80.Bell, 557 A.2d. 
81 Id. at 180. 
82 “The solution under our constitutional system, however, is for the State or 
municipalities to purchase the needed property rights or obtain them by eminent 
domain through the payment of just compensation, not to take them without 
compensation through legislative or judicial decree redefining the scope of 
private property rights.” Id.  
83 Id. 
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common law, history, and custom, how to engage in these local-
level interventions on behalf of the public is murky at best.84  
 
Further, the in-court debate over the future of the public trust 
doctrine as narrowed by Bell v. Town of Wells has continued, with 
occasional suggestions to re-asses that decision appearing in court 
opinions.85  The contrasts between the interests of landowners and 
the interests of the public will continue to give courts and lawmakers 
challenges as long as the debate over how to manage the public trust 
doctrine remains unsettled.  To prevent this, the State and local 
governments should implement land control and land use programs 
to clear up this confusion moving forward. 
 
 While conflicts over the public trust doctrine continue to 
simmer in the courts and the Legislature, citizens of and visitors to 
Maine rely heavily on coastal access—continuing confusion about 
the best approach to the public trust doctrine promises more conflict 
until a final resolution is reached.  Any final plan for a successful, 
constitutionally valid approach to the public trust doctrine must be 
rooted in Maine’s strong connection to the ocean and coastal areas.  
Maine has approximately 3,500 miles of coastline, including the 
islands, but only around 40 miles of that is set aside in public 
beaches.86  While fishing, fowling, and navigation rights are most 
protected by the public trust doctrine, recreation is a valuable part of 
coastal use and access.87  Particularly as Maine becomes more 
popular as a tourist destination and as visitors increasingly decide to 
move to the State permanently or purchase property, the confusion 
and legal mazes built up around public coastal access must be 
addressed to avoid further muddying of the waters.88  In her 
                                            
84 Id. at 182-88 (Wathen, J., dissenting). 
85 “I concur in the result and in the reasoning of the Court. I write separately, 
however, because I would overrule Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 
1989).” Eaton v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 49, 760 A.2d 232, 248 
(Saufley, J., concurring). 
86 MARINE LAW INST., UNIV. OF ME. SCH. OF LAW, PUBLIC SHORELINE ACCESS 
IN MAINE: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW 2004, 2. 
87 Eaton, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 51, 760 A.2d 232, 249 (Saufley, J., concurring). 
88 “Thus, we should acknowledge the problems created by our holding in Bell 
before landowners and the public are forced through years of uncertainty and 
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concurrence in Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., Chief Justice 
Saufley pointed out the irony that “[s]ince [the Moody Beach 
decision], a member of the public has been allowed to stroll along 
the wet sands of Maine’s intertidal zone holding a gun or a fishing 
rod, but not holding the hand of a child.”89   
 
Clearly, a statewide plan for public shoreline access must 
take recreational interests into consideration.  Maine relies heavily 
on tourism for economic stability and the number of visitors to 
Maine increases every year.90  These tourists visit Maine for 
numerous reasons and the coast is certainly one of them.  If coastal 
access decreases, Maine’s tourism industry will suffer.  Tourists are 
not the only ones with interests in accessing the coast, however.  
Maine residents also want access to the coast for recreational 
purposes and have been doing so for generations in some places.91  
Therefore, although it is not a part of the traditional activities 
protected by the public trust doctrine, Maine should include 
recreational considerations in its planning for better implementation 
and management of the public trust doctrine. 
 
However, a solution must consider the constitutional hurdles 
that already stymied the Legislature as well as the 
interconnectedness of Maine’s common law with the Massachusetts 
Colonial Ordinance.92  The Intertidal Land Act of 1987 attempted to 
find a solution that would not run afoul of the Colonial Ordinance 
but in doing so missed the constitutional implications.93  A well-
                                            
unworkable restrictions founded upon a faulty legal analysis.” Id. ¶ 53(Saufley, 
J., concurring). 
89 Ross, 2019 ME 45, ¶ 34, 206 A.3d 283 (majority opinion). 
90 The State saw more than $6 billion in tourism spending in 2017 and a 2.5% 
increase in visitors. 2017 Maine Office of Tourism Highlights, MAINE OFFICE OF 
TOURISM (2018), https://motpartners.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/2017-
Maine-Tourism-Highlights.pdf, [https://perma.cc/SGW5-FGBM].  
91 Although the Court found the evidence of the exact nature and extent of 
public recreational use of Moody Beach to be inconclusive, testimony clearly 
showed that the public had been accessing the beach for various recreational 
purposes since the 17th century.  Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 170 
(Me. 1989) (majority opinion). 
92 Id. at 170-72. 
93 Id. at 192 (Wathen, J., dissenting) (worrying that the Law Court dispensed 
with the Intertidal Lands Act of 1987 too casually and failed to suggest a proper 
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designed, land-use focused solution will not fall short on either of 
those fronts. As the State and the law move further from the Moody 
Beach Cases temporally and metaphysically, legal challenges to 
both public use and private restrictions on that use have led to 
plurality decisions and greater splintering of the understanding of 
the public trust doctrine in Maine.94 Following the recent decisions 
in Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport and Ross v. Acadian 
Seaplants, Ltd.,95 the need for a solution is more apparent than ever.  
The hair’s-breadth distinction in that case between private property 
and property held in trust by the State, analyzed under two distinct 
doctrinal approaches to the issue, illustrates the unworkability of the 
current jurisprudence and legal understanding of “the delineation 
between public and private rights in and to the intertidal area.”96  In 
the interests of judicial economy, landowner peace of mind, and 
public confidence in their rights, Maine must clarify exactly what 
rights belong to the public and what rights are reserved for the 
private landowners. 
 
IV. MAINE SHOULD IMPROVE ITS IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE BY CLEARLY 
DEFINING ITS LEGAL STANDING AND ESTABLISHING 
SPECIFIC METHODS FOR IMPLEMENTING IT 
                                            
way forward to address what the dissent characterized as “public rights [. . .] 
quickly and completely extinguished.”). 
94 “[The Moody Beach decision] has generated significant and expensive 
litigation resulting from the Court’s limitation of the public’s allowable 
activities to those that can be forced into the definitions of ‘fishing, fowling, and 
navigation.’ . . . The constrictive trilogy of that holding has bedeviled the State 
of Maine since that opinion was issued.” Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., 2019 
ME 45, ¶ 37, 206 A.3d 283 (Saufley, C.J., concurring). See, e.g., McGarvey v. 
Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, 28 A.3d 620 (resulting in a plurality decision in which 
the Law Court agreed that scuba diving fell under the public trust doctrine’s 
“navigation” provision but refused to rule on the lower court’s characterization 
of the final Moody Beach case as no-longer useful authority). 
95 Almeder, 2019 ME 151, 217 A.3d 1111 (holding that the Town has title to the 
contested beach therefore mooting the issue of property owner’s rights to 
exclude); Ross, 2019 ME 45, 206 A.3d 283 (majority opinion) (holding that 
rockweed, a species of seaweed that grows in the intertidal zone, belongs to the 
upland owners and is not part of the shoreland property “subject to certain 
public rights”) (internal citation omitted). 
96 Id. at ¶ 13. 
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Most of the discussion around improving the understanding 
and application of the public trust doctrine in Maine focuses on 
overruling the Moody Beach cases.97  Unless the Law Court makes 
dramatic changes in their approach to stare decisis, however, the 
Moody Beach cases will not be overturned.98  This focus on 
overruling those cases misses what the Law Court itself suggests, a 
solution combining legislative and local municipal powers.99 
 
A. Where the Public Trust Doctrine Stands in Maine’s  Legal 
System 
 
 Fortunately, for public shoreline access advocates, there is 
no question that the public trust doctrine is established in Maine’s 
legal framework.  In its many cases concerning coastal access, the 
Supreme Judicial Court has acknowledged unequivocally that the 
public trust doctrine exists and applies in Maine.100  Although the 
Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act was declared unconstitutional in 
                                            
97 See, e.g., DELOGU, supra note 8. 
98 Thaxter, supra note 33, at 139-40 (expressing concern over Justice Saufley’s 
concurrence in Eaton v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 176, 760 A.2d 233, which 
suggested that the Law Court had held too tightly to stare decisis in their 
decision in that case). See also Ross, 2019 ME 45, ¶ 40, 206 A.3d 283 (Saufley, 
C.J., concurring) (warning that stare decisis may cause the Moody Beach 
decision to become essentially unchangeable without quicker action to counter 
act it). 
99 Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 180 (Me. 1989) (majority opinion). 
100 “There can be no question that, pursuant to the original public trust doctrine, 
the public has the right to use the ocean itself, subject to certain governmental 
regulation.”  McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 12, 28 A.3d 620, 625.  
The Moody Beach decision did not abolish this right.  “The Moody Beach ruling 
noted that the public still had the right, by virtue of the public easement 
originating in the Colonial Ordinance, to use privately-owned intertidal land, but 
only if engaged in fishing, fowling, or navigation. The land to which this 
easement applies is the area between mean high water and mean low water (or to 
1,650 feet seaward from the high water, if the mean low watermark is even 
farther seaward). If the shoreline is beach, this is the wet sand area. If the 
shoreline is marsh, mudflat, or ledge, the intertidal area will commonly consist 
of gravel beaches or mud flats. However, the decision in the Moody Beach case 
was close (a 4-3 ruling regarding the issue of public rights in the intertidal area), 
tempting those who argue that the public’s rights ought to be interpreted more 
broadly.” Duff, supra note 40, at 6 
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the final Moody Beach Case, the Legislature clearly showed its 
intent to honor and enshrine the public trust doctrine.  When 
declaring this law unconstitutional, however, the court said that the 
method of implementation was wrong, not the intent of the 
legislation, endorsing the goal of the Legislature.101 
 
To move forward with protecting the public trust doctrine and 
its implementation, there are three issues Maine must address before 
progress can be made.  The first issue to address is identifying the 
exact constitutional backing for the public trust doctrine in the State.  
As of yet, there is no consensus from the courts and the Legislature 
regarding the constitutional nature of the doctrine.  Before any other 
steps can be taken, there must be a firm statement that the public 
trust doctrine does not violate the State’s Constitution and is in fact 
impliedly established in the State Constitution. 
 
 The second issue is reconciliation between the public trust 
doctrine and the Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance.  As discussed 
above, this Colonial Ordinance creates particular difficulty for the 
public trust doctrine by granting fee simple to the low water mark 
for the littoral landowners.  Just as it has repeatedly affirmed the 
existence of the public trust doctrine, the Law Court has also 
repeatedly adhered to the Colonial Ordinance, making it just as 
anchored in Maine’s coastal land law.  The relationship between the 
two must be defined. 
 
 The third and final issue to address in resolving the 
confusion around the public trust doctrine is the method for 
regulation and implementation.  Because Maine already has a strong 
history of allowing municipalities active control over shoreline 
access in their jurisdictions for many purposes, these systems of 
municipal control are the appropriate vehicle for moving ahead with 




                                            
101 See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989). 
[2020] Access for the Future 325 
 
1.   Finding a Constitutional Consensus in the Language of the 
 Maine State Constitution and in the Common Law 
 
Before any further work can be done establishing a workable 
application of the public trust doctrine in Maine, it must be 
determined that the doctrine is included in some way in Maine’s 
Constitution.102  This is necessary because the courts rely heavily on 
the State Constitution when analyzing legislative action that touches 
on public and private land access and use.103  Future legislation on 
the public trust doctrine will continue to meet challenges from 
various angles, but a clear statement that the doctrine itself is 
implied under the Maine Constitution will protect at least the 
foundational premise of that legislation.  When the court actively 
declined making such a clear statement, it indicated that the 
Legislative Powers Clause104 would be the likely section of the 
constitution to base such a statement on.105  That Clause states, “The 
Legislature, with the exceptions hereinafter stated, shall have full 
power to make and establish all reasonable laws and regulations for 
the defense and benefit of the people of this State, not repugnant to 
this Constitution, nor to that of the United States.”106  Based on the 
language of this Clause and the nature of the public trust doctrine, 
there can be a categorical determination that the public trust doctrine 
is protected by Maine’s constitution. 
 
                                            
102 The Supreme Judicial Court has cited this lack of clarity in the constitutional 
status of the doctrine when analyzing challenges to statutes limiting public 
access. Harding v. Comm’r of Marine Res., 510 A.2d 533, 536-37 (Me. 1986). 
103 See, e.g., Bell, 557 A.2d (finding the Intertidal Land Act unconstitutional 
under a takings analysis); Harding, 510 A.2d (refusing to determine whether the 
public trust doctrine is implied in Maine’s Constitution but stating that state 
action limiting public and private land use and access must pass constitutional 
muster); Me. State Hous. Auth. v. Depositors Tr. Co., 278 A.2d 699 (Me. 1971) 
(stating that the legislature has the power to enact laws for the benefit of the 
people of Maine so long as those laws are not “repugnant” to the Maine and 
United States Constitutions); Op. of Justices, 231 A.2d 431 (Me. 1967) (opining 
that proposed legislation did not violate the powers of the legislature to enact 
laws affecting land use and access). 
104 ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1. 
105 Harding, 510 A.2d at 537. 
106 ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1. 
326 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:2 
 
In order to make this determination, the basics of the 
doctrine must be compared with the language of the state 
constitution and the application of that language in the common law.  
First, the basic principle of the public trust doctrine is that the state 
holds the lands encompassed by the doctrine in trust for the 
people.107  Generally, this means that the state holds those lands for 
the benefit of the people.  Second, the language of the state 
constitution limits the legislative powers to actions “for the defense 
and benefit of the people.”108  Clearly, the language of the state 
constitution and the principles of the public trust doctrine parallel 
each other in their interest in the benefit of the people.  Third, the 
court has used the language of the Legislative Powers Clause to 
determine that “a statute that violated the State’s legal 
responsibilities as trustee for the public would not be reasonable for 
the public benefit and would therefore exceed the Legislature’s 
constitutional powers.”109  According to the court’s interpretation of 
this clause, any enactment from the Legislature must be three things: 
1) reasonable; 2) for the benefit of the people; and 3) not “repugnant 
to any other provision of the Maine or United States Constitution.”110   
 
While there has been some debate in the courts over the role 
of the judiciary in “determining whether any particular release by 
the Legislature of the people’s rights in submerged or intertidal 
lands conforms with the constitutional limitations laid down by the 
Legislative Powers Clause,”111 the specific role of the courts is less 
relevant than the language itself.  With the historic application of the 
public trust doctrine “for the benefit of the people” and the exact 
same language in the Maine Constitution, it is clear that the doctrine 
is encompassed by the state constitution.  There are no foreseeable 
problems with this reading, although the courts might face 
challenges reconciling it with jurisprudence from cases like Bell.  
                                            
107 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1846 (2018) (codifying the State’s holding of 
public reserved lands in trust for the public).  
108 ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1. 
109 Op. of Justices, 437 A2d 597, 606 (Me. 1981). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. (criticizing suggestions in Moor v. Veazie, 32 Me. 343, 360 (1850) that 
the Law Court does not have responsibility for determining the constitutionality 
of legislative acts under the Legislative Powers Clause). 
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Regardless, any future questions about the doctrine can start from 
an assumption that the doctrine is enshrined in the state constitution. 
 
2.   Reconciling the Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance of 
 1641-1647 with the Public Trust Doctrine 
Even with a clear determination that the public trust doctrine 
is part of Maine’s Constitution, it must be reconciled with another, 
older foundational basis for Maine’s handling of coastal land—the 
Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance.   As discussed above, the 
Colonial Ordinance created a possessory property interest for littoral 
landowners at odds with the long history of public ownership of the 
intertidal zone.  There is no question that the land granted to the 
private landowners under the Ordinance was historically the 
possession of the state in trust for the public.112  This does not mean, 
however, that the Colonial Ordinance is irreconcilable with the 
public trust doctrine.  In fact, despite its inherent restriction on 
public rights through grant of title to landowners, the Ordinance 
expanded certain rights, adding “fowling” to uses guaranteed to the 
public.113  The Ordinance, therefore, does not need to be viewed as 
a staunch enemy of the public’s rights.  In certain cases, courts have 
made statements seeming to indicate that any land privately held 
under the authorization of the Colonial Ordinance is not subject to 
any public access rights under the public trust doctrine.114  What 
                                            
112 “The shores of the sea and navigable rivers, within the flux and reflux of the 
tide, belong prima facie to the king, and may belong to a subject. ‘The jus 
privatum of the owner or proprietor is charged with, and subject to that jus 
publicum which belongs to the king's subjects.’ Hale, De Jure Maris, c. 6; De 
Portibus Maris, c. 7. Whatever right the king had by his royal prerogative in the 
shores of the sea and of navigable rivers, he held as a jus publicum in trust for 
the benefit of the people for the purposes of navigation and of fishery. These 
positions have been approved in judicial decisions too numerous to be 
mentioned. They are not known to have been denied by any respectable 
authority. . . . ‘The jus privatum that is acquired to the subject, either by patent 
or prescription, must not prejudice the jus publicum wherewith public rivers and 
arms of the sea are affected.’ Hale, De Jure Maris.” Moulton v. Libbey, 37 Me. 
472, 485-86 (1854). See also Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441, 448 (1882). 
113 Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., 2019 ME 45, ¶ 10, 206 A.3d 283. 
114 See, e.g., Sawyer v. Beal, 97 Me. 356, 357-58 (1903) (“In this State under the 
Colonial Ordinance of 1641, as modified by that of 1647, which has become the 
common law of this state, the owner of land upon the sea shore owns to low 
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these cases show, however, is that the Colonial Ordinance is 
established law, not that it supersedes the public trust doctrine.  Just 
as the courts have repeatedly stated that the Colonial Ordinance is 
the law, they have also repeatedly stated that the public trust doctrine 
is the law.115 
 
In order to reconcile the private ownership with the public 
trust doctrine, a review of the language of these cases affirming both 
policies clarifies the relationship between the two.  In State v. 
Wilson, 42 Me. 9 (1856), the court stated that the private owners did 
own the intertidal zone but this ownership did not give them the 
power to interfere with the public’s rights of fishing, fowling, and 
navigation.116  Courts have further stated that the public retains the 
rights under the public trust doctrine and only the Legislature has 
the power to curb those rights, not private landowners.117  The 
Colonial Ordinance itself specifies that the private landowner may 
not interfere with the right of the public to fish and fowl.118  In the 
final Moody Beach case, however, the Law Court listed the public’s 
rights as fishing, fowling, and navigation.119  Although the Law 
Court devoted a great deal of energy in the Moody Beach cases to 
cementing the Colonial Ordinance in Maine’s common law, it did 
concede that, although the landowner holds title to the intertidal 
zone, that title is subject to the rights of the public.120 
 
While the public trust doctrine and the Colonial Ordinance 
clearly coexist at common law, it is not clear exactly what form the 
                                            
water mark, unless the tide recedes more than one hundred rods, although of 
course the ownership of upland and flats may become divided by the act of the 
owner. Within the limits of his ownership he has all the exclusive rights of an 
owner.”). 
115 See, e.g., Conservation Law Found. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2003 ME 62, ¶ 
36, 823 A.2d 551, 563; Great Cove Boat Club v. Bureau of Pub. Lands, 672 
A.2d 91, 95 (Me. 1996); Whitmore v. Brown, 102 Me. 47, 56 (1906). 
116 State v. Wilson, 42 Me. 9, 28 (1856). 
117 Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441, 449-50 (1882). 
118 THOMAS G. BARNES, THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWES AND LIBERTYES 
CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS at 35 (1975). 
119 Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 173 (Me. 1989). 
120 “The plaintiffs' title is subject to the public right of use declared by the 
Colonial Ordinance.” Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509, 516 (Me. 1986). 
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public trust is held in under that regime.  Generally, the public trust 
doctrine requires that the state hold the intertidal land in trust for the 
benefit of the public but the Colonial Ordinance takes that 
ownership from the State and grants it to the private landowners.  
This distinction is ultimately one of form rather than function.  The 
Colonial Ordinance does grant title to those landowners but it 
specifically does not take away the rights of the public.  The rights 
specified in the Ordinance do not include navigation,121 but no court 
has stated that this third right of the public trust doctrine is not 
available in Maine.  When approached from within the intricacies of 
centuries of common law and contorted legal analysis, the 
Ordinance and the doctrine appear starkly at odds.  However, the 
courts, with the possible exception of the final Moody Beach case,122 
have simply stated over and over again that the private ownership 
may not interfere with the public’s rights. 
 
3.   Ensuring Public Access to the Intertidal Zone with Land Use 
 Controls 
Having established that the public has retained its rights to 
use of the intertidal zone despite the Massachusetts Colonial 
Ordinance’s grant of title to the private landowners, the legal avenue 
for preserving those rights must be determined.  The legislative 
solution attempted during the Moody Beach cases failed, not 
because of the rights it sought to preserve, but because of the manner 
in which it preserved them.123  Other laws exist in Maine that seem 
to create avenues for public shoreline access but they have been rife 
with legal conflict.  For example, Maine’s prescriptive easement law 
has been addressed as related to public shoreline access numerous 
                                            
121 BARNES, supra note 122, at 35. 
122 Despite the language of the court affirming the public rights preserved under 
the Colonial Ordinance, the holding in that case indicates that the public may 
only use the intertidal land with permission of the landowners. Likely due to the 
confusion around the public trust doctrine in Maine, the court attempted to use 
easements as a way to distinguish the public rights from the private, resulting, 
unfortunately, in a determination that the public must have permission of 
landowners. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989). 
123 Id. at 176-77. 
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times in the courts, but the results are inconsistent.124  Recently, the 
Law Court determined that there is a “presumption of permission” 
when the public uses the shoreland areas and this presumption 
prevents a prescriptive easement from being established by 
eliminating the required adverse nature of the use.125  Beyond 
prescriptive easements, no other statutory provision has had 
significant bearing on public shoreline access litigation. 
 
Fortunately, a legislative solution can be created that will 
honor the interests of both the general public and the private 
landowners.  What the Legislature cannot do, however, is repeat the 
same errors of the Intertidal Land Act and create laws that amount 
to an unconstitutional taking of private land.  Obviously, any takings 
challenge could be avoided if the landowners were adequately 
financially compensated, but equitable financial compensation is an 
unattractive option, as the landowners would resent the 
governmental action and the costs would likely be extreme.  A better 
legislative solution should instead make use of the significant 
powers granted to municipalities under Maine’s Constitution.126  
This constitutional provision designates Home Rule127 power to 
municipalities in Maine, meaning these municipalities are a vehicle 
for protecting public access rights under local authority.  The 
legislative solution, therefore, is a statute directly authorizing local 
                                            
124 See, e.g., Eaton v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 176, 760 A.2d 232 (majority 
opinion) (holding that the town and therefore the public had acquired a 
prescriptive easement over the beach); Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport, 106 
A.3d 1115 (Me. 2014) (questioning the possibility of acquiring prescriptive 
easements in the shoreland context); Cedar Beach/Cedar Island Supporters, Inc. 
v. Gables Real Estate LLC, 2016 ME 114, 145 A.3d 1024 (ruling that the public 
did not have a prescriptive easement to a road leading to the beach). 
125 Almeder, 106 A.3d 1115. 14 M.R.S.A. § 812 (2018). 
126 ME. CONST. art. VIII, part 2, § 1 (“The inhabitants of any municipality shall 
have the power to alter and amend their charters on all matters, not prohibited by 
Constitution or general law, which are local and municipal in character.  The 
Legislature shall prescribe the procedure by which the municipality may so 
act.”). 
127 “A state legislative provision or action allocating a measure of autonomy to a 
local government . . . .” Home rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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municipalities to enact ordinances to address and manage the 
public’s rights.128   
 
 Setting up programs in municipalities to closely manage and 
organize public shoreline access is not a novel idea in Maine.  Towns 
already exercise a certain amount of control over fishing activities, 
including implementation of ordinances and systems for managing 
shellfish harvesting and designating conservation spaces.129  Under 
municipal management programs, towns allow and regulate various 
manners of fishing access.  People wanting to fish on Maine’s coast 
via privately owned land may access public paths for clamming, 
mooring places for boats on private shoreline, and even wharves for 
larger operations.130  These systems set up for fishing access are 
generally successful in ensuring public access while keeping private 
landowners satisfied131 and can be used as models for creating new 
programs for other forms of public access or for improving plans 
already in place.  In order to design effective and durable programs 
for increasing and preserving public access to the coast, elements 
such as the stability of the public trust doctrine in Maine’s legal 
cannon and the relationship between the State Legislature and the 
municipal governments must be taken into account.  With this solid 
                                            
128 Another possible option is a statute similar to the Intertidal Development 
Regulations in Massachusetts (310 MASS. CODE REGS. §9.53 (2017)), which 
require that development in intertidal areas “not significantly interfere” with 
public rights of fishing, fowling, and navigation.  This kind of regulation, 
however, does not establish systems through which public access is established.  
Due to limitations from cases such as Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 
1989), any legislation Maine undertakes must address not only public use of the 
intertidal zones, but also public access to those zones, typically achieved by 
crossing privately owned land. 




130 David Kallin & Rita Heimes, Legal Tools to Enhance Public Coastal Access 
While Protecting Private Property Rights, UNIVERSITY OF MAINE SCHOOL OF 
LAW MARINE LAW INSTITUTE 5 (March 2008), 
http://www.accessingthemainecoast.com/coastal_access_toolkit/Legal_Tools_fo
r _Access.pdf, [https://perma.cc/WZ83-2K2Z]. 
131 See id. 
332 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:2 
 
legal and legislative foundation, an improved program for public 
shoreline access will be less vulnerable to legal challenges. 
Because of the coastal character of much of the State of 
Maine, models and systems already exist where municipalities 
exercise authority over their coastlines under statutory authority.132  
Rather than write totally new legislation, the Legislature may amend 
the already existing shoreland zoning statute to include specific 
authorization for municipalities to engage in certain programs to 
ensure public access rights.  There are two main ways in which 
municipalities can accomplish this: zoning ordinances and contracts.  
Zoning ordinances restrict how a landowner uses their property, for 
example by limiting development that would reduce shoreline 
access.  Contracts are agreements between municipalities and 
landowners or developers that establish certain terms that the parties 
will both abide by.  Each of these options has benefits and 
drawbacks and they will be addressed in turn. 
 
a.  Zoning as a Tool for Ensuring Public Access 
 
By statutory mandate, all towns in Maine with shoreline 
within their boundaries must have a shoreland-zoning plan.133  
Because of Maine’s constitutional provision of Home Rule, 
municipalities have a great deal of flexibility in creating these plans.  
Maine also has specific statutory mandate that coastal plans must 
“[s]upport shoreline management that . . . promotes public access to 
the shoreline and that considers the cumulative effects of 
development on coastal resources.”134  A zoning ordinance could 
require, for example, that a developer set aside a certain amount of 
land as a public access point, such as a roadway or footpath.   
                                            
132 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 435 (2018) (“To aid in the fulfillment of the 
State's role as trustee of its waters and to promote public health, safety and the general 
welfare, it is declared to be in the public interest that shoreland areas be subject to zoning 
and land use controls. . . . The purposes of these controls are . . . to conserve shore cover, 
and visual as well as actual points of access to inland and coastal waters . . . . [I]t is the 
intention of the Legislature to recognize that it is reasonable for municipalities to treat 
shoreland areas specially and immediately to zone around water bodies rather than to 
wait until such time as zoning ordinances may be enacted for all of the land within 
municipal boundaries.”). 
133 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 435 (2018). 
134 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 1801(3) (2018) (emphasis added). 
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This kind of zoning ordinance, however, still potentially 
creates an unconstitutional taking by depriving the landowner of 
exclusive use of that portion of their land.  Therefore, these 
ordinances must include incentives to landowners and developers to 
ensure the taking is compensated.  Some possible incentives for 
developers and landowners include tax incentives (such as reduced 
tax rates in exchange for providing public access points or a tax 
credit where land dedicated for public access is treated as a 
charitable donation), modified density and setback requirements 
(allowing developers to construct more units than typically allowed 
so that they receive more economic benefit from the land not set 
aside for public access), and reduced licensing and permitting fees 
for developers.  Finally, the private landowners would significantly 
benefit from these ordinances, as the public access points would be 
limited to specific areas and they would not face challenges from the 
public for preventing access. 
 
b.  Establishing Contracts Between Municipalities and Private 
 Landowners 
 
Another option, utilized substantially in the Town of 
Kennebunkport, is the creation of contracts between municipalities 
and landowners to ensure public access to the shore.135  These 
contracts do not convey any property rights and should be for use 
rights only.  They must meet all of the legal requirements for a valid 
contract, meaning the municipality must give the landowners 
something of value in return for a pledge to allow public access.  In 
Kennebunkport, for example, the landowners agreed to allow public 
access to Goose Rocks Beach and in return, the Town maintains 
parking spaces and enforces limits on activities such as camping, 
fires, and loitering.136  The contract, enacted as a town ordinance in 
2013, also establishes certain areas of the Beach that are off limits 
to the general public and indemnifies private landowners for any 
                                            
135 Duff, supra note 40 at 10. 
136 Beach Use Ordinance for Kennebunkport, Maine, section IV(C) (2013). 
334 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:2 
 
claims brought against them by the public.137  In circumstances 
where a zoning ordinance is not practical or would be ineffective 
(such as in areas where there is no active development or where 
funds for compensation would be unavailable), such contracts for 
shoreline access and use can sufficiently address public and private 
interests.  Further, when a contract is enacted in an ordinance, it will 
remain in effect in perpetuity unless the voters choose to amend or 
repeal it.   
 
c.  Other Options Exist which are less likely to be Effective and 
 Useful than Zoning and Contracts 
 
Occasionally, other tools can be used in local settings to 
ensure public shoreline access.  These tools are less likely to be 
effective than those discussed above and should only be considered 
where there are no other options.138  Private landowners may choose 
to grant access by means of a gift, an easement, a right-of-way, a 
lease, or a license.139  These private agreements are slightly 
troublesome, however, as they can create situations where the well-
heeled public might pay landowners for exclusive access or where 
only certain special interest groups are allowed to cross the private 
land.140  Although such private agreements make some progress 
towards addressing public access concerns, they should be 





The public trust doctrine is here to stay.  Despite the 
complexity of reconciling the doctrine with the Colonial Ordinance 
                                            
137 Beach Use Ordinance for Kennebunkport, Maine, section VII(J) (2013). Such 
release from liability is also covered under the Maine Tort Claims Act, ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 159-A (2018) (“Maine Recreational Use Statute”). 
138 Keeping in mind that these tools will serve to maintain the duty of the State 
to preserve public use rights to the intertidal zone. Where zoning or contracts are 
not an option, the duty will still remain and less attractive tools can be utilized. 
139 Duff, supra note 40, at 3. 
140 A landowner might agree to let certain outdoor recreation clubs cross their 
land to access the water for kayaking, for example. 
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of 1641-1647, the State of Maine can honor both of these 
foundational common law policies.  In fact, Maine must adopt ways 
to work with both of these competing ideas of shoreline ownership 
and access in order to ensure continued growth and development of 
the State as a whole.  Maine’s economy relies heavily on the 
coastline and as access shrinks, so do the benefits reaped from this 
feature.  Without creating systems through which the interests of 
private landowners and the public are effectively managed, Maine 
will continue to see confusion and conflict in this area of the law.  A 
solution is readily available in the form of municipal action 
authorized by the Legislature.  By placing the power of managing 
public access in the hands of municipalities, Maine can establish 
better public shoreline access while avoiding running afoul of the 
rights and interests of private littoral landowners. 
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